Legal Education and the 'Idealistic Student': The Need for a 'Governmental' Analysis by Ball, Matthew
 
Australasian Law Teachers Association - ALTA 
2006 Refereed Conference Papers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Australasian Law Teachers Association – ALTA 
 
Annual Conference 
 
 
 
61st Annual ALTA Conference 
 
Victoria University, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia 
4 – 7 July 2006 
 
 
Legal Knowledge: Learning, Communicating and Doing 
 
 
 
Published Conference Papers 
 
 
 
 
 
This paper was presented at the 2006 ALTA Conference in the  
‘Legal Education’ Interest Group 
 
Australasian Law Teachers Association - ALTA 
2006 Refereed Conference Papers 
 
  2
 
 
 
The Australasian Law Teachers Association (ALTA) is a professional body which 
represents the interests of law teachers in Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea 
and the Pacific Islands.  
Its overall focus is to promote excellence in legal academic teaching and research with 
particular emphasis on supporting early career academics, throughout Australasia, in 
the areas of:  
(a) Legal research and scholarship; 
(b) Curriculum refinements and pedagogical improvements in view of national 
and international developments, including law reform;  
(c) Government policies and practices that relate to legal education and research; 
(d) Professional development opportunities for legal academics; 
(e) Professional legal education and practices programs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conference Papers published by the ALTA Secretariat 
2006 
 
Edited by Professor Michael Adams, Professor David Barker AM and Ms Samantha 
McGolrick 
Associate Editor Janet Fox 
 
ALTA Secretariat 
PO Box 222 
Lindfield NSW 2070 
AUSTRALIA 
Tel: +61 (2) 9514 5414  
Fax: +61 (2) 9514 5175 
admin@alta.edu.au  
www.alta.edu.au  
 
Australasian Law Teachers Association - ALTA 
2006 Refereed Conference Papers 
 
  3
LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE ‘IDEALISTIC STUDENT’:  
THE NEED FOR A ‘GOVERNMENTAL’ ANALYSIS 
 
MATTHEW BALL∗ 
 
It has been widely argued within the legal education literature that few of the students 
that enter legal education with the hopes to pursue ‘socially idealistic’ aims (such as 
fighting for social justice, or addressing social disadvantage) go on to actually pursue 
these aims in legal practice.  The narrative that seeks to explain this shift in the 
graduate’s ‘working legal identity’ is the critical legal perspective. This posits that a 
student’s ideals are repressed through ideological indoctrination and learning 
experiences which create passive receptacles into which legal professional ideology 
can be deposited. 
 
By utilising the work of the French philosopher Michel Foucault, this paper seeks to 
examine some of the assumptions upon which this narrative is based, including the 
notions of ideology, the operation of power and the role of the subject.  Doing so 
ought to provide a catalyst for examining the development of a law student’s ‘working 
legal identity’ in a different way. 
 
                                                 
∗ PhD Candidate, School of Justice, Faculty of Law, Queensland University of Technology, Australia. 
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I INTRODUCTION: THE ‘IDEALISTIC’ LAW STUDENT 
 
A number of studies into the motivations of students undertaking law degrees indicate 
that upon graduation, many hope to practice law in the public interest, or for other 
goals that could be broadly defined as ‘socially idealistic’ (such as fighting for social 
justice, or addressing social disadvantage).1  What becomes apparent, however, is that 
legal education does not foster these social ideals, and consequently relatively few of 
these idealistic students go on to actually pursue these aims in legal practice.2  In fact, 
many students become vocationally oriented, cynical about the ability of the law to 
achieve social change, experience alienation and silencing,3 or more extreme 
problems with their mental and physical health.4 
 
The understanding that legal education can cause students to develop such cynicism 
has had an important effect within legal education literature.  It has made the project 
of legal education uncertain; ‘[making] it lose familiarity, …[provoking] a certain 
number of difficulties around it’, and allowing a law student’s political consciousness, 
their ‘knowledge’ of the law, and the lens through which they view the role of the law 
in society (referred to further as their ‘working legal identity’) ‘…to enter into the 
domain of thought’.5  It has caused this to become an object of reflection, the focus of 
research, and something upon which to intervene and consequently shape in 
alternative ways, by academic, professional or governmental actors.  In short, it has 
problematised the formation of the law graduate’s political consciousness. 
                                                 
1 Judy Allen and Paula Baron, ‘Buttercup goes to Law School: Student Wellbeing in Stressed Law 
Schools’ (2004) 29 Alternative Law Journal, 285, 286; Tracey Booth, ‘Student Pro Bono: 
Developing a Public Service Ethos in the Contemporary Australian Law School’ (2004) 29 
Alternative Law Journal, 280, 281; Jeremy Cooper and Louise Trubek, ‘Social Values from Law 
School to Practice: An Introductory Essay’ in Jeremy Cooper and Louise Trubek (eds), Educating for 
Justice: Social Values and Legal Education (1997) 1, 14; Debra Schleef, ‘“That’s a Good 
Question!”’: Exploring Motivations for Law and Business School Choice’ (2000) 73 Sociology of 
Education 155, 157; Julian Webb, ‘Developing Ethical Lawyers: Can Legal Education Enhance 
Access to Justice?’ (1999) 33 The Law Teacher 284, 285-6. 
2 Schleef, above n 1, 157.  As Schleef states, ‘the trend away from a social justice orientation while in 
law school has been widely documented’. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Sheldon and Krieger cited in Allen and Baron, above n 1, 285-6.  These included a decline in life 
satisfaction and wellbeing, or the development of depression. 
5 Michel Foucault, ‘Problematics’ in Sylvère Lotringer (ed), Foucault Live: Collected Interviews, 1961-
1984 (1996) 416, 421. 
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As a result of this problematisation, the major concern among many legal education 
researchers (which Schleef describes as their ‘Holy Grail’),6 has become the desire to 
understand why law students, upon graduation, take jobs in corporate practice despite 
entering legal education with ‘altruistic aspirations geared toward public service’.  
Although they will only briefly be touched on here, answers to this question from 
within the legal education literature focus generally on three central elements.  Simply 
stated, it is suggested that: 
 
• External pressures, chiefly the legal profession, narrowly constrain the content 
of legal education,7 particularly the compulsory subjects (known colloquially 
as the Priestley 11)8 which becomes even more apparent and pervasive as 
universities align themselves to market discourses, user-pays philosophies, and 
thus pay heed to student and employer demands;9 
• As this content therefore overwhelmingly reflects the dominant (primarily 
corporate or pro-business) interests of the legal profession, it constitutes a 
form of ideological indoctrination which desensitises students to concerns for 
social justice,10 and thus; 
                                                 
6 Schleef above n 1, 157. 
7 Alan Hunt, ‘The Case for Critical Legal Education’ (1986) 20 The Law Teacher 10, 11; Rob Guthrie 
and Joseph Fernandez, ‘Law Schools in the 21st Century’ (2004) 29 Alternative Law Journal 276, 
277; Mary Keyes and Richard Johnstone, ‘Changing Legal Education: Rhetoric, Reality, and 
Prospects for the Future’ (2004) 26 Sydney Law Review 537, 555; Margaret Thornton, Dissonance 
and Distrust: Women in the Legal Profession (1996) 75; Martin Tsamenyi and Eugene Clark, ‘An 
Overview of the Present Status and Future Prospects of Australian Legal Education’ (1995) 29 The 
Law Teacher 1, 4, 8. 
8 Keyes and Johnstone, above n 7, 557; Thornton, above n 7, 77 
9 Anne Bottomley, ‘Lessons From the Classroom: Some Aspects of the ‘Socio’ in ‘Legal’ Education’ in 
Philip Thomas (ed), Socio-Legal Studies (1997) 163, 180; Keyes and Johnstone, above n 7, 554, 548-
549; Margaret Thornton, ‘The Idea of the University and the Contemporary Legal Academy’ (2004) 
26 Sydney Law Review 481, 483; Ian Ward, Introduction to Critical Legal Theory (2nd ed, 2004) 148. 
10 Kennedy (cited in Adrienne Stone, ‘Women, Law School and Student Commitment to the Public 
Interest’ in Jeremy Cooper and Louise Trubek (eds), Educating for Justice: Social Values and Legal 
Education (1997) 56, 61) argued that law school provides students with ‘ideological training for 
willing service in the hierarchies of the corporate welfare state’, Příbáň stated that legal education 
reproduces a ‘false consciousness’ within students, (Jiri Příbáň, ‘Sharing the Paradigms?  Critical 
Legal Studies and the Sociology of Law’ in Reza Banaker and Max Travers (eds), An Introduction to 
Law and Social Theory (2002) 119, 127) while Gabel and Kennedy (in Ward, above n 9, 147) argued 
that without noticing it, law students adopt an ‘ideological framework’, because law school trains 
students to be lawyers, not ‘real people’ (Getman, in Ward above n 9, 149). 
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• This indoctrination occurs not only through the actual law curricula, but also 
through the ‘hidden curriculum’ that exists within the law school, consisting of 
teaching methodologies that create passive students,11 classroom atmospheres 
that foster competition between students12 and set implicit boundaries on 
debate,13 social hierarchies within the law faculty to which students must 
defer, and messages implicit within interaction with peers that encourage 
students to make certain educational choices.14 
 
This paper seeks to examine some of the foundational elements of these claims, 
primarily the notions of ideology, the conceptualisation of power, and the role of the 
subject15 inherent within these arguments.  Each will be unpacked further below 
utilising the work of the French philosopher and historian Michel Foucault.  
Fundamentally this paper seeks to argue that these conceptual deficiencies coalesce 
under what could be considered a limited notion of governance.  Although due to 
space restrictions Foucault’s notion of ‘governmentality’ will not be discussed, this 
paper intends to at least lay the groundwork for this as a possible direction for legal  
                                                 
11 Such as lectures in which legal content is uncritically presented to passive students, and students are 
assessed through methods in which their legal knowledge is simply to be regurgitated.  See for 
example Hilary Charlesworth, ‘Critical Legal Education’ (1988-89) 5 Australian Journal of Law and 
Society, 27, 30; Gerry Simpson and Hilary Charlesworth, ‘Objecting to Objectivity: The Radical 
Challenge to Legal Liberalism’ in Rosemary Hunter, Richard Ingleby and Richard Johnstone (eds), 
Thinking About Law: Perspectives on the History, Philosophy and Sociology of Law (1995) 86, 106; 
Richard Johnstone and Sumitra Vignaendra, Learning Outcomes and Curriculum Development in 
Law: A Report Commissioned by the Australian Universities Teaching Committee (2003) Australian 
Universities Teaching Committee [395, 463] 
 <http://www.autc.gov.au/projects/completed/loutcomes_law/split_pdf.htm> at 15 January 2007; 
Thornton, above n 7, 78; David Weisbrot, ‘Taking Skills Seriously’ (2004) 29 Alternative Law 
Journal 266, 267. 
12 Allen and Baron, above n 1, 285-6; Webb, above n 1, 287. 
13 Kevin Dolman, ‘Indigenous Lawyers: Success or Sacrifice?’ (1997) 4 Indigenous Law Bulletin [13-
17] <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/ILB/1997/69.html> at 22 Feburary 2007; Heather 
Douglas, ‘The Participation of Indigenous Australians in Legal Education 1991-2000’ (2001) 24 
University of New South Wales Law Journal [11] 
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UNSWLJ/2001/32.html> at 22 February 2007; Thornton, 
above n 7, 93, 104. 
14 Bottomley, above n 9, 177; Thornton, above n 9, 495 
15 See, eg, when utilising the concept of the subject, Foucault is referring to the individual person 
subjected to some form of power, and not a particular unit within a law degree.  
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education research, one that could address the conceptual deficiencies outlined here.16 
 
II LOOKING DIFFERENTLY AT THE CRITICAL NARRATIVE 
 
Building from the arguments of the critical legal perspective17 outlined above, it is 
posited that the interests held by idealistic students are repressed by the legal 
professional ideologies deposited within them.  The end result is a student that has 
been indoctrinated to think that the law operates rather well, and only requires 
tinkering at the edges every now and then in order to improve it.18  The corollary of 
this argument is that if only the legal profession did not have such a tight grip over the 
content of the law curriculum; if only the teaching methodologies fostered 
reflectiveness and incorporated appropriate pedagogical practice into their 
construction; if only law students could see through the ideological haze that clouds 
their vision and allow the light of the ‘truth’ about the law to shine forth, their ‘real’ 
nature as socially active legal professionals would be allowed to express itself and 
they would actively engage in campaigning for social justice. 
 
Such conclusions, by virtue of their development from within the critical legal 
narrative (and their attempt to provide support for the political claims of this 
perspective), perhaps have more to do with propagating radical legal discourses19 than 
reflecting a useful way of looking at how law students are governed.  As such, a 
number of assumptions are relied upon, which Foucault’s work allows one to think 
differently about.  It is to this different way of thinking that this paper will now turn. 
 
                                                 
16 For broad introductions to Foucault’s thought, including the notion of ‘governmentality’, see 
generally Sara Mills, Michel Foucault (2003); Clare O’Farrell, Michel Foucault (2005).  As this 
paper outlines continuing research, the way that ‘governmentality’ might be used in the field of legal 
education will be the subject of future discussion. 
17 It is important to state that this discussion does not seek to essentialise the critical legal perspective; 
there are a number of theoretical perspectives that are referred to by the umbrella term.  However in 
relation to theorising the development of cynicism within idealistic law students, critical analyses 
predominate and primarily utilise these explanatory tools. 
18 Charlesworth, above n 11, 31; Simpson and Charlesworth, above n 11, 107. 
19 See Nickolas James, Power-Knowledge and Critique in Australian Legal Education 1987-2003 (PhD 
Thesis, Queensland University of Technology, 2004) 246, 249-50. 
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A Repression through Ideology 
In arguing that the ideology presented to students represses their real interests via a 
false knowledge of the law, the critical legal perspective primarily assumes that 
students have ‘real’ interests, and that these interests have been repressed.  The notion 
of ideology assumes that a universal human subject exists who would have access to 
knowledge of a universal and transcendental truth if social institutions had not 
imposed ideological constructions upon them, or caused the development of a false 
consciousness within them.20  This view suggests that there exists a pre-given human 
subject that has a consciousness that power subsequently seizes upon.21  From this 
perspective, ideology is a negative element through which ‘…the knowledge relation, 
is disturbed, obscured, veiled by the conditions of existence, social relations, or the 
political forms imposed on the subject from the outside’.22  Instead, to Foucault, the 
body was the ‘inscribed surface of events’;23 as he stated, 
 
[t]he individual is not to be conceived as a sort of elementary nucleus…on which 
power comes to fasten or against which it happens to strike, and in so doing subdues 
or crushes individuals.  In fact, it is already one of the prime effects of power that 
certain bodes, certain gestures, certain discourses, certain desires, come to be 
identified and constituted as individuals.24 
 
Here, Foucault argues that there is no human subject that understands the world 
perfectly at some stage in their life and can fully express their ‘real’ interests, who, as 
ideological relations subsequently blankets them in layers of falsity, experiences the 
repression of such interests.  Instead, the individual and the coherent and systematic 
structures of ideas with which they understand the world cannot be considered 
separately, as neither can be said to exist prior or external to social relationships. 
                                                 
20 O’Farrell, above n 16, 98. 
21 Michel Foucault, ‘Body/Power’ in Colin Gordon (ed), Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and 
Other Writings 1972-1977 (1980) 55, 58; See also, Michel Foucault, ‘Truth and Power’ in Colin 
Gordon (ed), Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977 (1980) 109, 
118. 
22 O’Farrell above n 16, 98. 
23 Mills, above n 16, 82, 83. 
24 Michel Foucault, ‘Two Lectures’ in Colin Gordon (ed), Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and 
Other Writings 1972-1977 (1980) 78, 98. 
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Thus, political and economic conditions are not a veil for the subject of knowledge, 
but instead are central elements in the formation of such subjects.25  A law student’s 
identity is therefore not necessarily produced by that student’s own consciousness, but 
is produced by the discourses through which they are provided an understanding of 
the world, and the relations of power inherent within them (the notion of discourse 
will be outlined below).26  We therefore ought to see the individual as one of the 
effects of power. 
 
The other primary assumption here is that the knowledge about the law provided to 
students is false.  This is related closely to the idea that an individual’s real interests 
are repressed, because only a false ideological knowledge could obscure ‘real’ 
interests to the advantage of a group or individual exerting unwarranted influence.  
The notion of ideology is primarily utilised in analyses that have intellectual and 
theoretical foundations within Marxism (such as the critical legal perspective) to refer 
to statements or ideas that are produced by or within institutions that influence the 
thinking and subsequent action of individuals, and which are then imposed in some 
form.27  As Mills states, it usually describes 
 
the means whereby oppressed people accept views of the world which are not 
accurate and which are not in their interests.  Ideology…is the imaginary 
representation of the way things are in a society, and this fictive version of the world 
serves the interests of those who are dominant in society.28 
 
Thus, ideology assumes that a ‘truth’ and a ‘falsity’ exists (in this case a truth and 
falsity about the law) which can be taught in law school.  As Foucault states, ideology 
‘stands in virtual opposition to something else which is supposed to count as truth’, 
                                                 
25 Michel Foucault, ‘Truth and Juridical Forms’ in James Faubion (ed), Power: Essential Works of 
Foucault 1954-1984: Volume 3 (2000) 1, 15. 
26 Michel Foucault, ‘Technologies of the Self’ in Paul Rabinow (ed), Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth.  
Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984: Volume 1 (2000) 223, 225. 
27  Mills, above n 16, 54. 
28 Ibid 34 [emphases added]. 
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and thus the notion of ideology is inconsistent with his intention to see ‘historically 
how effects of truth are produced within discourses which in themselves are neither 
true nor false’.29  The concept of ideology maintains that knowledge and power are 
separate elements; that true knowledge is disinterested and can thus only exist 
externally to the distortions of power.30  Conversely, it is relations of power that 
create false knowledge.  However, by developing the concept of power-knowledge, 
Foucault could place at the centre of his analyses the power relations that are inherent 
in the production of all knowledge.  (The alternative conception of power outlined by 
Foucault will be discussed further below.) 
 
Foucault’s notion of discourse was a more useful concept than that of ideology, as it 
recognises that power and knowledge are joined.  Discourses consist of either 
individual statements, or those grouped together, that have some sort of effect or 
meaning, and that are constituted by unwritten rules, structures and practices that 
determine and influence their content and production.31  These rules, structures and 
practices are employed to keep certain statements in circulation, while attempting to 
displace other competing statements from different discourses.  Power relations are 
inherent within the operation of these structures, and thus are important in the 
production of a discourse’s ‘truth’.  Therefore, no single discourse has a purchase on 
an external and neutral truth.  Instead, in their operation, discourses play a productive 
role in that they structure an individual’s thinking, such as by presenting a coherent 
way of looking at and understanding the world.32  As an individual’s statements, 
thoughts and actions are influenced and regulated to a certain extent through 
discourses, they play an important role in the creation of a subject. 33 
 
As such, because all discourses employ relations of power to produce different 
‘truths’ (as well as different ‘falsehoods’), a false knowledge of the law cannot be 
presented to a student.  Coupled with the recognition that individuals are the effects of 
                                                 
29 Foucault ‘Truth and Power’, above n 21,118. 
30 David Hoy, ‘Power, Repression, Progress: Foucault, Lukes, and the Frankfurt School’ in David Hoy 
(ed), Foucault: A Critical Reader (1986) 123, 131. 
31 Mills, above n 16, 53. 
32 Ibid 56. 
33 Ibid 62. 
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such power relations and do not exist externally removed from them, an individual 
can have no ‘real’ interests that are able to be repressed by false knowledge of the 
law.  As mentioned above, positing that law students have ‘real’ interests has more to 
do with furthering the image of the law student and the truths about the law that are 
propagated through radical discourse.34 
 
B Conception of Power 
In the above discussion, passing reference has been made to Foucault’s alternative 
conception of power.  This is another important place where the critical narrative can 
be examined in a different way by Foucault’s work.  According to Foucault, the 
dominant way of conceiving power is as something essentially repressive, as that 
which excludes or forbids, whose effect on those who are subjected to it is obedience, 
and which is bound with the state or other apparatus simply representative of class 
interests.35 
 
This ‘repressive hypothesis’ of power can also lead one to see power as an activity 
that operates from the top-down, being a property held by a group or institution (such 
as the ruling class, the State or the legal profession), and consisting of oppressive 
actions upon passive and powerless individuals (such as by the legal profession upon 
law students).36  Foucault saw this as an inadequate way of thinking about power 
because it did not consider the complex array of often quite specific mechanisms that 
operate within the apparatus that are normally associated with power (the State, the 
family, the school), as well as those not traditionally so associated.  Nor does it allow 
one to take into account the numerous points of resistance or other blockages that 
occur in the operation of these mechanisms.37 
 
                                                 
34 See for example James, above n 19, 246, 249-50. 
35 Michel Foucault, The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality Volume 1 (1998) 82-85; Michel 
Foucault, ‘Power Affects the Body’ in Sylvère Lotringer (ed), Foucault Live: Collected Interviews, 
1961-1984 (1996) 207, 207, 210; Michel Foucault, ‘Questions on Geography’ in Colin Gordon (ed), 
Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977 (1980) 63, 72; Foucault, 
‘Two Lectures’, above n 24, 90. 
36 Mills, above n 16, 34. 
37 Foucault ‘Power Affects the Body’, above n 35, 210. 
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Believing that ‘…power would be a fragile thing if its only function were to 
repress…exercising itself in a negative way’,38 Foucault saw power as essentially 
something more positive and productive than mere repression and prohibition.  Power 
is ‘…bent on generating forces, making them grow, and ordering them, rather 
than…dedicated to impeding them, making them submit, or destroying them’.39  For 
example, the knowledge presented to an individual as a form of productive relations 
of power has already been discussed.  Furthermore, the exercise of power plays an 
important role in producing methods for accumulating knowledge, tools for 
observation, and methods of control, thus ‘put[ting] into circulation a knowledge, or 
rather apparatuses of knowledge, which are not ideological constructs’.40  As 
O’Farrell states, power ‘generates particular types of knowledge and cultural order’, 
as well as the behaviour of individuals through the regulation of their activities and 
other disciplinary mechanisms.41 
 
Particularly relevant to Foucault’s rethinking of traditional notions of power is his 
intention to move away from the idea that power is centred in and held by the ruling 
class or the State.  This line of thinking suggests that the operation of power would 
therefore represent an individual or collective ‘will’.42  In contrast to this view, 
Foucault argues that power must be conceived as operating through numerous 
mechanisms that cannot be reduced to operating because of a single will, or 
emanating from a central point,43 and cannot be solely analysed from the top down.44  
The operation of power may be intentional (that is, it may be calculated and have 
particular aims and objectives), but it is non-subjective (thus these aims and objectives 
do not necessarily originate in an individual will, or the design of a single actor).45  
Thus, the cynicism of idealistic law students cannot simply be said to occur because 
                                                 
38 Foucault ‘Body/Power’, above n 21, 59. 
39 Foucault ‘The Will to Knowledge’, above n 35, 136. 
40 Foucault, above n 24, 102. 
41 O’Farrell, above n 16, 100-1; see also Mills, above n 16, 36. 
42 Foucault ‘The Will to Knowledge’, above n 35, 92; Foucault ‘Power Affects the Body’, above n 35, 
210.  In the case of legal education, this could refer to the idea that the legal profession ‘holds’ such 
power over law students. 
43 Foucault ‘The Will to Knowledge’, above n 35, 93 
44 Joseph Rouse, ‘Power/Knowledge’ in Gary Gutting (ed), The Cambridge Companion to Foucault 
(1994) 92, 107. 
45 Foucault ‘The Will to Knowledge’, above n 35, 94. 
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the legal profession seeks only to create legal professionals in its own image: there are 
multiple historical and cultural contingencies upon which the present is based.46 
 
C Conception of the Subject: Docile Bodies and Active Subjects 
The conception of the subject is another central area in which Foucault’s work differs 
to the critical narrative.  This is where Foucault’s ideas about power lead to a 
rethinking about the notion of the active subject, as his conception of power sees 
notions such as the freedom, autonomy and resistance within power relationships as 
important; something that traditional methods of conceptualising power do not 
comfortably allow for. 
 
Foucault’s later work led him to define power as the ability ‘…to structure the 
possible field of action of others’.47  An individual or group exercises power when it 
is able to set limits upon, or conversely encourage in specific ways, the conduct of 
another individual; an individual that is recognised as one who is free to act and 
respond in different ways to this power.48  As Foucault states, 
 
[power] incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; it releases or 
contrives, makes more probable or less; in the extreme, it constrains or forbids 
absolutely, but it is always a way of acting upon one or more acting subjects by 
virtue of their acting or being capable of action.49 
 
Therefore, if power is the structuring of the possible field of action of others, this 
implies that an individual has a number of possible options for action from which to 
                                                 
46 See, eg, ,although the law lecture and the closed-book examination often result in students becoming 
passive, uncritical and unreflective, these techniques cannot be said to be employed within legal 
education because of this.  There are numerous factors that contribute to the use of a particular 
teaching or assessment methodology within the law classroom, such as resourcing issues.  See also 
Johnstone and Vignaendra, above n 11, 322-6. 
47 Michel Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power’ in James Faubion (ed), Power: Essential Works of 
Foucault 1954-1984: Volume 3 (2000) 326, 341. 
48 Ibid 340-341. 
49 Ibid 341 [emphasis added]. 
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choose, and hence a relative degree of freedom.50  Foucault clarifies that ‘[p]ower is 
exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are ‘free’’.51  Similarly, this 
idea of power assumes that an individual has the autonomy to choose between 
different courses of action.  If this is the case, then there is also the potential for 
resistance to occur, allowing for power relations to be modified.  In this way, Foucault 
sees resistance as ‘the key word, in this dynamic’ because if resistance did not exist, 
nor would a power relation: rather it would be a state of obedience or domination.52 
 
The incorporation of resistance into power relations, and the idea of an active subject, 
do not easily fit within the critical narrative.  For example, this narrative suggests that 
legal education constitutes a disciplinary regime that inscribes upon the docile bodies 
of law students how to ‘think like a lawyer’, despite ‘…the process of transformation 
[being] facilitated with [the student’s] consent’.53  It primarily considers students who 
acquiesce to the professional ideology they are presented with as more free than those 
that acquiesce only in response to external pressures.  Such views still posit that 
external influences such as market discourses and peer influences act upon students, 
but nevertheless assume that such choices are imposed in some way; that they are 
reluctantly chosen and that students are not actively constructing their own legal 
identities.  The implicit conclusion drawn is that if these influences were removed, 
law students would inevitably become politically engaged.  As such, coupled with the 
use of terms such as repression and indoctrination, the active agency of law students 
in constructing their own legal identities (particularly in a politically apathetic and 
non-idealistic manner) is difficult for the critical perspective to comprehend, let alone 
embrace. 
 
                                                 
50 Michel Foucault, ‘The Ethics of the Concern for the Self as a Practice of Freedom’ in Paul Rabinow 
(ed), Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth.  Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984: Volume 1 (2000) 281, 
292; Foucault, above n 47, 341. 
51 Foucault, above n 47, 342.  Here, freedom refers to the ability to behave in a resistant manner and 
thus exercise power differently. 
52 Michel Foucault, ‘Sex, Power and the Politics of Identity’ in Sylvère Lotringer (ed), Foucault Live: 
Collected Interviews, 1961-1984 (1996) 382, 386. 
53 Thornton, above n 7, 79-80. 
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Recognising notions of freedom, autonomy, and resistance as inherent within power 
relations provides an individual with the potential to play a positive role in developing 
their own selves.  As such, they actively construct their identity by employing certain 
practices and techniques of the self, according to different types of knowledge and for 
particular ends.54  These techniques of the self refer to those actions which 
 
permit individuals to effect by their own means, or with the help of others, a certain 
number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of 
being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, 
purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality. 55  
 
Thus the active agency of subjects is central, and any examination of the way in 
which the law student’s ‘working legal identity’ develops must account for the 
potential for resistant actions, and thus the production of different legal identities.  
Recognising these notions of freedom, autonomy and resistance as central presents a 
significant development from the critical narrative. 
 
III CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has demonstrated that, in thinking about the development of the law 
student’s ‘working legal identity’, the work of Foucault differs from the critical 
narrative on three major grounds: the notions of ideology, power and the subject.  For 
the critical narrative, these elements coalesce under a limited conception of 
governance: a limited way of conceptualising the knowledge to which individuals are 
subject, how external influences and interpersonal relations shape the creation of a 
‘working legal identity’, and how an individual acts upon themselves and reacts to 
others in this process.  This paper has sought to examine the conceptual foundations 
of this critical perspective. 
                                                 
54 Although there is no room here to discuss this further, this constitutes the direction that Foucault’s 
work took in the early 1980s.  See also Michel Foucault, ‘On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview 
of Work in Progress’ in Paul Rabinow (ed), Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth.  Essential Works of 
Foucault 1954-1984: Volume 1 (2000) 253; Michel Foucault, The Use of Pleasure: The History of 
Sexuality Volume 2 (1990). 
55 Foucault, above n 26, 225. 
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Although it has not been discussed here, Foucault’s notion of ‘governmentality’ 
provides a different way of thinking about governance that can address the conceptual 
limitations discussed above.  How this notion can be utilised within legal education 
continues to be the object of further research; this paper simply seeks to open the door 
to the domain of such analyses within the field of legal education. 
 
 
